Marco SRS Air Bag Suspension

Airbag Code Reader

CAN STRONG AUTHENTICATION SORT OUT PHISHING AND FRAUD?

Organized criminals have realised (precisely because they are

organized) that phishing and identity theft can be carried out

over an extended period, by piecing together snippets of

information from separate attacks for a final sting. For

example, logging on using an authentication token will

neutralize password stealers, but the very presence of a token

authentication request can make an ideal trigger for spyware,

especially if its goal is to build up a pattern of your on-line

behaviour by monitoring your financial transactions.

This paper traces the recent evolution of malware techniques

in response to technological changes in our security regimes,

and proves once again the old cliche that the price of freedom

is eternal vigilance. The Bad Guys are out to get us, and if they

can turn our defences against us, even in the slightest way,

then they surely will.

Q. Can strong authentication sort out phishing and fraud?

A. No.

Q. Hmm. That makes for a rather short paper, don’t you think?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you go into a little more detail?

A. These days, a lot of phishing is orchestrated, or at least

assisted, by malicious code somewhere in the network. This

means that solving the problem of malware is effectively a

necessary part of solving the problems of phishing and fraud.

(When we say ‘fraud’ in this paper, we mean on-line fraud

against users conducting business via their PCs. We do not

mean other sorts of financial fraud such as credit card abuse or

kiting.)

But solving the malware problem is hard – indeed, it is

undecidable. After all, the Halting Problem tells us that we

cannot write a program which will reliably determine the

behaviour of all other possible programs:

‘No program can say what another will do.

Now, I won’t just assert that, I’ll prove it to you: I will prove

that although you might work til you drop, you can’t predict

whether a program will stop.

[. . .]

You can never discover mechanical means for predicting the

acts of computing machines.

It’s something that cannot be done. So we users must find

our own bugs; our computers are losers!’ [1]

This general result can be cast into specific terms to show that

a program which will distinguish unfailingly between malware

and non-malware cannot be made. Malware authors always get

a ‘next chance’ to circumvent the protection we currently have

in place [2].

Q. However, that doesn’t mean it is always easy for malware

authors, or for phishers, to go to the next level, does it?

A. No. I was just being dramatic. Nothing, whether it is

authentication or something else, can actually solve the

problem of phishing, in a mathematical sense of solving it. But

we can make phishing much harder, and authentication is

indeed one of the tools we can use.

Q. Staying on the topic of malware detection for a moment,

how hard is it to produce malware – a new banking trojan, for

instance – which evades detection?

A. On one hand, it is getting harder. On modern PCs,

anti-virus software can be much more computationally

aggressive than it was in the past. Generic detection techniques

mop up a lot of new trojans proactively. On the other hand, it is

getting easier. You may even be able to precompute whether

your new malware will succeed.

One way to do this is through a targeted attack, where you

write a trojan and aim it at a specific part of the Internet, such

as a single company, whose defensive posture is known to you.

Targeted attacks are not especially difficult to orchestrate, and

there is a paper at this conference which investigates this

phenomenon [3].

Another way is to use an on-line service to which you can

submit malware samples and from which you will receive

automated replies telling you which products detected it, and

what they called it.

Q. On-line services to help you fine-tune your phishing

trojans?

A. That’s not how they position themselves, of course. Several

such services exist, and some are strongly supported by the

security industry. VirusTotal [4], for example, has permission

to use some 25 different products for scanning incoming files.

In return, samples are sent to vendors who miss them, thus

helping to improve detection and responsiveness.

Unfortunately, VirusTotal allows you to withhold submissions

from vendors (though this is not the default), which could be

said to play into the hands of organized crime and the

counterculture.

Q. So let’s assume you can create a new phishing trojan and

target me and my company with it. How can authentication, or

anything else, help me then?

A. When you are carrying out a financial transaction on-line,

there are several things that it pays you (literally and

figuratively) to check:

• that trustworthy software is orchestrating the transaction,

• that it really is you yourself conducting the transaction,

• that you really are trading with the person or service you

expect,

• that the details of the transaction are correct.

Authentication, clearly, can assist you with this.

Q. How? Can you start by giving me an example of the sort of

authentication technology which can help with each item above?

A. Of course. Let’s ask the questions we want answered one

by one.

• Is the right program doing the work? Some endpoint

firewalls can help with this, for example by using

cryptographic checksums to regulate which applications

can make what sorts of connection to which servers.

• Is it really you kicking off the transaction? A hand-held

authenticator can ensure that you use a new password

every time you connect, which helps to prevent replay

attacks where previously-stolen credentials are re-used

by someone else.

• Are you connecting to the right service? Digital

certificates can help to reassure you that you are not

speaking to an imposter at the other end.

• Are you carrying out the transaction you intended?

Encryption and digital signatures provide protection

against exposing the details of the transaction, and help

prevent the transaction being tampered with in transit.

Q. Firewalls, tokens, certificates and encryption. Aren’t these

old technologies that we’ve been using for ages? Are they

failing us?

A. Yes and no. There are three main ways in which

security-related systems fail, and these are mirrored by the

main ways in which cryptographic systems fail. This is

unsurprising, since computer security relies heavily on

cryptography. Things can go wrong because:

• the underlying design is flawed (e.g. a defective cipher),

• the implementation is incorrect (e.g. insufficient key

material is used),

• the system is used wrongly (e.g. users write down their

PINs).

In a seminal paper about the failure of cryptosystems [5],

Ross Anderson shows that problems in implementation and

use seem to be the main reasons for failure, rather than weak

cryptography.

With hindsight, this is perhaps obvious, since they are the two

aspects in which human error is most likely and in which

rigorous peer review is hardest. In the last case, human error

can effectively be guaranteed by cheating or misleading users.

Of course, what this means is that systems which can work

correctly to provide us with safe on-line commerce may fail in

unexpected ways.

Q. But if a system is vulnerable because it doesn’t deal well

with inadvertent or unexpected use, doesn’t that mean the

design is wrong?

A. Perhaps it does. But the PC, and its operating system, is

designed to be a flexible, general-purpose tool which can be

adapted to many tasks, such as word processing, browsing the

Internet, watching movies, making art, designing buildings

and searching for extraterrestrial life. Users are generally free

to add and remove any software they like at any time in order

to enjoy this flexibility.

When you carry out commerce on-line, for example when

clicking on a [Buy now] link, you need to turn your PC –

temporarily, and at short notice – into a secure cryptographic

device which acts as an important component of the

transaction.

So it is hardly surprising that the design of such a system

makes certain assumptions about the state of the PC, and the

awareness of the user. And it is hardly surprising that the PC,

or the user, or both, sometimes let the system down.

Q. Is this really unsurprising? Don’t the banks owe it to us to

do better?

A. This paper isn’t really about the social contract which

banks do or don’t have with their customers, so we’ll just look

very quickly at both sides of the argument.

Critics of the banks say that the banks aren’t doing enough.

They say it is the banks who have the greater interest in

Internet commerce, because it allows them to close branches,

lay off tellers and front-of-house staff, and thus to save an

awful lot of money. This money, they argue, should already

have been used to make Internet banking much safer than it is.

The banks, on the other hand, can argue at least as reasonably

that the popularity of on-line commerce is driving the need

for Internet banking (eBay, QED). They can also point out

that their younger customers not only much prefer Internet

banking but that they expect it to be cheap, and easy, and

accessible from anywhere. If the bank cuts off their Internet

banking in the interests of safety, and requires them to visit a

branch to sort out any possible problems (a reasonable

security precaution, you might think), this is viewed as a bug

in the system, not a feature.

Uri Rivner of RSA, which makes and sells cryptographic

solutions including hand-held authenticators, agrees:

‘...[I]n the online consumer authentication market, usability

is in many cases of greater importance than security. It’s

true that some people [would] like to see changes in the

banks’ security procedures and [would] appreciate it if the

financial institution handed them authentication devices or

came up with other visible security measures.

But other customers don’t really care about all of that; they

demand security from the bank, but all they really want is

to access their account, pay bills and transfer money

without any delay or additional challenge...’ [6]

Q. OK, let’s go back to the failure points above. Can you give

historical examples of each sort of failure, to paint a picture

of the sorts of thing that can go wrong? Let’s start with the

most exciting-sounding one: a cryptosystem which got cracked.

A. An example many people probably know about is Wired

Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the authentication and encryption

system originally proposed for wireless networking. WEP

relies on a secret key, either 40 or 108 bits in length; to access

and use the network, you need to know the key. (This, in turn,

means you can read all the traffic on the network, just as if

you were on a LAN.)

As it happens, the cipher used by WEP has a statistical flaw

which affects the randomness of its early output bytes.

Interestingly, the cipher, RC4, is also used in SSL (which we

will talk about later), but in a way which does not cause the

problems seen in WEP. Nevertheless, the flaw exists in the

RC4 cryptosystem itself, or at least its key scheduling

algorithm (KSA) [7], rather than simply in WEP’s

implementation.

This statistical flaw allows an attacker to recover a WEP key

by capturing and analysing a few million wireless packets. So

there is no way to fix WEP without changing it for something

different. WEP is irrevocably broken.

Q. How about a system which was based on sound

cryptography but implemented dangerously?

A simple example of an implementation flaw – one which

was fixed by devising an alternative but compatible approach

– is the way early Unix systems stored their password file. All

users and programs need read access to this file, as it is

(amongst other things) the database which maps usernames,

such as ‘fp’, onto real names, such as ‘Ford Prefect’.

However, early Unix implementations also stored each user’s

hashed password in this file, so anyone could retrieve the

hashes and perform a dictionary attack against them off-line.

This meant that weak passwords could quickly be recovered

without leaving evidence of the dictionary attack on the

targeted system.

The backward-compatible solution, used in Linux to this

day, was to duplicate the password file, to replace the

hashes in the world-readable file with a dud entry, such as ‘x’,

and to read-protect the second copy of the file, called the

shadow file.

User programs worked exactly as before, except that they saw

dud information for the password hash, which they didn’t

need anyway. Only the login program needed changing to use

the shadow file instead.

Q. And what about a case where we used security wrongly

and paid the price?

Perhaps understandably, many of us are willing to assume that

anyone who is prepared to confirm his identity must, ipso

facto, be trustworthy. So when we come across an unknown

program which is digitally signed, we sometimes assume that

the signature tells us something about the morals and the

character of the signatory, rather than simply about his name.

So, for example, in late 2002, many people willingly

downloaded and installed software known as FriendGreetings

from a company identifying itself as Permissioned Media [8].

These downloads were in response to an email, usually

received from a friend or acquaintance, which promised an

electronic greetings card.

FriendGreetings displayed two End User Licence Agreements

(EULAs), in the second of which it claimed permission to

email everyone in your Outlook address book. Which, of

course, it promptly did.

For system administrators and for those in your address book,

the side-effects were little different from a mass-mailing virus

such as LoveBug (VBS/LoveLet-A). The signatories, of

course, claimed that the virus-like behaviour of their software

was entirely legal, as it asked for permission before sending

any email.

But who had ever heard of Permissioned Media Inc. of Sun

Towers, First Floor Office #39, Ave. Ricardo J. Alfaro,

Panama City, El Dorado Zona 6, Panama? And why did they

trust this unknown company with their email address book?

Q. That was in 2002. Have users got smarter since then?

A. FriendGreetings was a problem for system administrators,

because of the unwanted email it generated. It was an

annoyance for users, for the same reason. The application also

had the troublesome side effect of preventing programs from

appearing in the taskbar, which interfered with the correct use

of an affected PC until it was correctly cleaned up. But

FriendGreetings didn’t set out to steal information that could

be used to plunder your bank account or to carry out

fraudulent transactions.

Phishing has raised the bar in terms of the risk that each user,

and each user’s organization, faces from malicious code. This,

in turn, has raised both concern and awareness about malware

and the importance of preventing it. Whether this counts as a

silver lining to the cloud that organized crime has brought

into the malware scene is not clear, but an optimist would say

that it has.

Q. That’s an interesting observation, but I notice you have

skirted the question. Have users got smarter since 2002?

A. Security experts are always on a slippery slope when

commenting on the knowledge, or lack of it, shown by

users. To come down too hard against users sounds arrogant,

but to exonerate them from any responsibility for their own

PCs is to assume that technology can solve all security

problems, which, as we demonstrated light-heartedly at the

outset, it cannot.

However, recent research carried out in the USA [9] paints a

rather dismal picture of levels of common sense amongst

users. (More accurately, it paints a dismal picture of a very

small sample of academic staff and students at a prestigious

American university. The rest of us might back ourselves to

do rather better, but the results are interesting nevertheless.)

In this study, 22 participants were sent to 19 different

websites allegedly belonging to a range of well-known banks

and other companies associated with on-line financial

transactions. Of these, seven were real and 12 were spoofed.

The goal was to identify which ones were bogus. Only one

site (a real one) was identified correctly by all 22 participants.

All the other sites, real and fake, got a mixture of answers.

Eight of the sites (including six spoofed ones) were

misidentified by 11 (50%) or more of the participants. In the

worst two results, more than 80% of the participants said that

a bogus site was real.

The study explains these results quite clearly. It is worth

repeating the explanation (or, as the study more

conservatively calls it, a hypothesis) because it emphasizes

how hard it is for us to be aware of everything we need to take

into account when making value judgements on-line, and

shows how easy it is for phishers and other on-line fraudsters

to exploit this:

‘...Participants made incorrect judg[e]ments because they

lacked knowledge of how computer systems worked and

did not have an understanding of security systems and

indicators. More experienced participants were tripped up

by visual deception, e.g. when the address was spoofed or

when images of the browser [user interface] with security

indicators were copied into website content. The study also

revealed issues that we did not anticipate [...]:

• Some users don’t know that spoofing websites is

possible. Without awareness [that] phishing is possible,

some users simply do not question website legitimacy.

• Some users have misconceptions about which website

features indicate security. For example, participants

assumed that if websites contained professional-looking

images, animations, and ads, [then] the sites were

legitimate...’

So users may be getting smarter, but there is still a lot that

they need to learn and to know.

Q. If we become aware of what this study calls ‘security

indicators’ and can use them reliably, will we be safe? Can

the SSL padlock save the day?

A. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is very largely the fabric of

on-line commerce today. But most people assume that it is

simply what it says: secure, which means that too much trust

is often placed in the padlock which most browsers display

when the SSL protocol is in use. After all, padlock means

SSL, and SSL means secure.

In fact, there are a lot of problems with SSL, though

fortunately these do not appear to be of the ‘flawed

cryptography’ sort. The problems are a little to do with

implementation (or at least with deployment) and a lot to do

with use.

Very broadly speaking, SSL provides three main facilities for

securing web communications:

• the exchange of digital certificates, permitting each end

of the link to establish something about the identity of

the other end,

• the secure exchange of session keys allowing for

encryption without the need to share key material in

advance,

• the encryption of the data in each session, using the keys

exchanged above.

When we are banking on-line, the encryption is important,

because we do not want others to be able to sniff our account

numbers, or to learn how much money we are spending with

whom. But the first stage, mutual authentication, is in many

ways more important. Without it, we can easily be tricked into

engaging in an encrypted conversation with a complete

stranger.

Unfortunately, there are many ways in which this

authentication can be subverted, or can go wrong. Phishers

know this, and so are able to succeed despite, or even because

of, the presence of SSL connections and the padlock in your

browser.

Q. But if a connection is secure and authenticated, how can it

be subverted?

A. There are several different ways in which you can be

tricked or misled when making SSL connections, for example:

• By falsified security indicators. A fake website may serve

up pages which render in your browser so that they

suggest a secure connection. The falsification may range

from the trivial, such as displaying a picture of a padlock

somewhere on the page, to the sophisticated, where

scripts in the page rewrite elements of the browser’s user

interface to simulate an encrypted site.

• By the use of an illegally acquired certificate. This is

uncommon, but not unknown. For instance, in 2001, the

world’s biggest issuer of SSL certificates, Verisign,

issued and signed a certificate in the name ‘Microsoft’ to

an individual unassociated with the software giant [10].

• By a worthless certificate. It is easy to produce a

self-signed SSL certificate. In this case, you act as your

own certifying authority, rather than paying a known

third party to do this job for you.

• By a low-quality certificate. Some certification

authorities (CAs) issue low-cost certificates, or trial

certificates, which make it easy for smaller vendors to

enter the market. In some cases the identity checks

carried out before issuing these certificates are cursory

and almost instantaneous, so the certificates have little

value for authentication.

• By malware active on your PC. Malware can suppress

security errors, create falsified security indicators, paint

over input forms in order to capture or modify your input

before it is encrypted by SSL, or otherwise mislead you

into how your PC or your browser is behaving.

• By becoming accustomed to starting secure connections

from insecure pages. Numerous legitimate on-line

financial sites [11] invite you to login from their main

(http) page, then take you via some scripting to their

secure (https) site. In many cases these insecure pages

include padlock imagery, lending credibility to spoofed

sites which do the same.

Q. So how can you out-trick such trickery?

A. Fortunately, many phishing tricks are obvious once you

know what to look for. In particular, you should familiarize

yourself with SSL certificates and how to check them. If you

know how your bank usually identifies itself to you, for

instance, then you will more easily be able to carry out

‘negative authentication’ when you need to.

The site http://whichssl.com/, though not as independent as its

name might imply (it is run by a certification authority),

offers a handy ‘test your own site now’ link. This takes you to

an https site of your choice whilst explaining, in an adjacent

browser window, how to use your browser to check the SSL

certificate supplied by that site.

Most browsers make an effort to warn you when dubious

certificates have been presented, but (as [9] suggests) many

users click through these warnings without giving them the

attention they deserve. It doesn’t help that legitimate sites

frequently allow certificates to expire, or publish certificates

on one website issued in the name of another, or use

certificates which provoke browser warnings which can safely

be ignored. This just reinforces risky behaviour.

Q. You mentioned ‘negative authentication’. Can’t we run

community-based databases, like real-time block lists (RBLs)

for spam, which help us to identify on-line fraudsters?

A. Several such schemes exist. Netcraft, for example [12]

offers a browser toolbar add-on through which you can report

and identify phishers on-line. Netcraft allows ISPs,

organizations and the like to utilize its database of known

dubious locations on the Internet.

This can be useful in mitigating inbound communications

which reference these sites, such as email which tries to

persuade you to visit a spoofed website, or to download a

piece of malware which the phisher can turn against you later.

It is also useful in blocking outbound connections which are

aimed at these sites. The blocking can be done by a web filter,

an endpoint firewall, a router at the organization’s boundary,

or in the user’s browser.

Microsoft has offered an add-on phishing filter [13] for some

time; this has become a built-in feature in Internet Explorer 7,

currently in its Beta 2 release.

So community-based block lists can help, and it is suggested

that they can be very responsive if the community is large

and widespread. (If just one person in the entire world

reports a phishing site, everyone else can benefit from this

knowledge.)

But the phishing criminals can react nimbly, too. For

example, using a network of botnet-infected PCs, it would be

a simple matter to ‘report’ that a slew of legitimate sites were

bogus. Correcting errors of this sort could take the

law-abiding parts of the community a long time, and render

the block list unusable until it is sorted out. Alternatively, the

community might need to make it tougher to get an Internet

site added to the list, to resist false positives. This would

render the service less responsive.

Q. You mentioned botnets above, which brings to mind

keylogging and other common tricks employed by malware.

How are we doing against these threats?

A. A trojan on your PC can succeed without subverting your

connection to an on-line service. In fact, many

banking-related trojans specifically watch out for you to make

a legitimate connection to your bank. (In this case, it may,

ironically, be to the trojan’s advantage that you check out the

bank’s SSL certificate closely, thus ensuring that you are

connected correctly. If a trojan is intending to manipulate the

contents of a transaction, there is no point in doing so when

the victim is connecting not to the bank but to a ‘service’

operated by a rival criminal concern!)

Initially, the most common PC-based attack against banking

was indeed the keylogger. The concept is simple: watch for a

banking transaction, record the keys typed in (hopefully

including account number, password or other personally

identifiable information) and later pass those keystrokes to

someone outside.

An early response to keyloggers was the so-called virtual

keyboard, a script-based or image-based system which

requires you to click on pictures of keys using the mouse.

Often, the letters or numbers on the virtual keyboard move

around randomly each time you visit the site, so that the

location of the mouse movements cannot be replayed. Many

banks still use this system, believing that it provides

additional security.

Malware authors were quick to respond, painting over input

forms and popping up virtual keyboard simulators which

captured your details before forwarding them to the bank (or,

to simplify the programming, before faking an error and

forcing you to start again, this time with the trojan allowing

your connection to proceed normally).

We can expect this sort of arms race to continue.

Unfortunately, the phishers are more nimble than the banks. It

might take a bank more than a year to introduce brand new

web programming and access control into their on-line

systems. After all, change control, correctness and quality are

an important part of a bank’s IT ethos.

The criminals have no such constraints – and they do not

especially care if it is their first, tenth or one hundredth trojan

of any new sort which succeeds. The cost of 99 programmatic

failures is inconsequential to them; the bank, on the other

hand, must succeed at the first attempt.

Q. The malware you describe above relies on capturing

information which can be re-used later. Doesn’t the hand-held

authenticator, or token, make that impossible?

A. No. Or, more accurately, not entirely. What tokens are

intended to do is to introduce an unpredictable variable value

into the authentication process, instead of a conventional

password. This means that any password captured by a trojan

cannot be re-used, because each password is designed to be

used once, and only once.

This does, indeed, render a lot of current malware impotent.

Under some circumstances, however, a trojan can still benefit

from capturing a one-time password, for example if it can

capture the password before it is used. This may be possible

using what is called a man-in-the-middle attack. A handy

pictorial summary of a range of such attacks can be found

in [14].

Q. Can you give a quick description of how such an attack

works?

A. Imagine that you have to play chess against two

Grandmasters. (This assumes that you are not a top chess

player yourself.) There is a way in which you can guarantee

not to get thrashed by both players, provided that you play

them both simultaneously, and that you are allowed to play

White in one game, and Black in the other.

All you do is wait for your White opponent to move. Then

make this move against your Black opponent. When the Black

opponent responds, repeat this move against the White player.

The two Grandmasters are effectively playing each other. You,

the man-in-the-middle, are simply relaying moves between

them, although you are turning these moves into what looks

like two separate games.

A similar principle applies with a man-in-the-middle trojan.

The idea is simple, though the implementation may be

complex. The trojan waits for you to begin what you believe

to be a transaction with the bank, though you are in fact

transacting with the trojan. This means that you mistakenly

authenticate against the trojan, and the trojan uses the

information you supply – including the one-time password

you carefully type in from your token – to authenticate itself

with the bank.

The trojan is then free (at least within certain parameters) to

alter various aspects of the transaction, such as the amount,

the destination account, or any other details of its choosing.

Q. Are there already Trojans which can carry out this sort of

attack?

A. Not yet. The main reason is almost certainly that token

authentication is not very common in the Internet banking

world. This is partly because the expense and complexity of

introducing it to every customer is unappealing to the banks,

and partly because the need to carry and use a token is still

unpopular with many customers. So there has been little need

for organized crime to take on the task of writing this more

difficult sort of trojan.

Q. When the criminals are forced to confront stronger

authentication, how hard will they find it?

The criminals may not need to subvert the authentication

process at all. Instead, they may simply come up with new

ways of tricking you out of your money. Spammers, for

example, already know how to conduct on-line fraud without

getting hold of your account number or password. Many

spammers operate by persuading you to conduct a transaction

willingly and overtly, using your hand-held authenticator if

you have one, and then supplying sub-standard goods, or

nothing at all, in return.

Now imagine how much easier it would be for criminals to

seduce you into bogus transactions if they had a complete

picture of your spending habits. For example, if they knew

you paid your rent on the seventh of every month, and which

agency you paid it to, they could attempt to phish you into

paying it into a different account. And before you respond by

saying, ‘but it’s such a big step to start paying bills to a new

recipient, so that would simply never work’, remember that it

sounds just as far fetched to believe that users would willingly

go and type in their personal banking credentials into an

unknown website on the say-so of an email which could have

come from anywhere, and probably did.

The technology to allow outsiders to keep detailed track of

your secure on-line activities, including everything you buy,

and when, and where, already exists.

One example is the application Marketscore, created by the

market research company comScore Networks, Inc. In return

for a modest payment for participation, users joined the

‘Marketscore Panel’ and installed the Marketscore

application. Amongst other features, Marketscore

incorporated what is effectively a man-in-the-middle SSL

proxy which aimed to crack open and to monitor all your

secure on-line transactions, sending data about everything you

bought, and how much you paid for it, back to comScore.

Q. Surely a legitimate application wouldn’t go quite that far?

A. ComScore is no longer distributing Marketscore, perhaps

due to the publicity it received when some American

universities decided to block it outright, despite the strongly

held tradition of academic freedom on their networks [15].

But here is what comScore themselves [16] have published

about its behaviour:

‘...[C]omScore has recruited for the Marketscore Panel over

one and a half million opt-in members who have agreed to

have their Internet behavio[u]r confidentially monitored

and captured on a totally anonymous basis. These members

give comScore explicit, opt-in permission to confidentially

monitor their online activities in return for valuable benefits

[...].

Those individuals who choose to be part of the Marketscore

Panel [...] download comScore’s technology to their

browser where it unobtrusively routes the member’s

Internet connection through comScore’s network of

servers [...]. The technology allows comScore to capture

the complete detail of all the communication to and from

each individual’s computer – on a site-specific,

individual-specific basis. Information captured on an

individual member basis includes every site visited, page

viewed, ad seen, promotion used, product or service

bought, and price paid.

[...]

It is extremely challenging, even with a consumer’s opt-in

permission, to capture information communicated to and

from a browser in a secure session (e.g. any purchase

transaction). In order to do this successfully, technology is

required that “securely monitors a secure connection”.

[C]omScore’s patent-pending technology does this at no

incremental cost to comScore or risk to the panelists...’

As dubious as this may sound, remember that some security

products provide gateway-based tools to open and examine

SSL connections out of a network. Whilst this is culturally

rather different to placing a market-research-oriented SSL

proxy on every PC, it is technically and functionally similar.

Like many technologies, whether it is good or evil depends on

how it is used, and who is using it.

Q. Let’s return to where we started, namely the subversion of

the endpoint via malware and potentially unwanted

applications. Will improvements in operating system security

help prevent users being ‘marketscored’ by criminals?

A. There is a long answer to that, in which we could look at

some of the new features of Windows Vista, such as User

Access Control, which tries to restrict the subversive use of

the administrator account, and at the features of SELinux,

which does away with the idea of an all-powerful account

completely.

The short answer points out that operating systems are

becoming more resistant to trivial exploitation, but reminds us

all that there are still two important risk vectors:

• Users and administrators who make errors of judgement,

and who carry out fully-authenticated installations of

risky or inappropriate software. Vista’s warning that ‘this

operation requires elevation’, and its careful display of a

program’s digital certificate (or lack of it), for example,

can be undone with a single mouse click to authorize the

offending operation.

• Organized crime and the counterculture, who have shown

a willingness to invest considerable amounts of time in

probing even the most secure systems for tiny cracks into

which they can drive a subversive wedge. Additionally,

they are nimble enough to respond to technological

changes, such as their subversion of virtual keyboards, in

weeks or even days, a luxury which security

professionals cannot afford.

Q. So can we win? And is authentication the key component to

staying ahead of the phishers, even though it cannot solve the

whole problem?

A. Some say that we can, and it is. For example, researchers

from a Swiss financial institution and IBM [17] have

proposed an on-line banking authentication system which

sounds very secure.

Briefly summarized, the system relies upon an external smart

card reader, with a numeric keypad and a small display. The

cryptographic computations for authentication and security

between the user’s browser and the bank are offloaded to the

smart card (which is tamper-resistant and contains an

operating system and software of its own); the entry of

passwords and one-time codes is offloaded to the card

reader’s keypad (where they cannot be sniffed or altered); and

each transaction is confirmed cryptographically after its

details are shown on the card reader’s display (where they are

not subject to manipulation by malware writing on top of data

on the screen).

Of course, this system is complex, which means it will be

hard to implement correctly; it is comparatively expensive,

which will slow down its adoption by the banks; and it is

inconvenient, which will slow down its acceptance by users.

Also, phishers currently target our banking credentials so that

they can later masquerade as us in order to raid our accounts.

They do this because they can, because it is easy, and because

it works. As we have seen, making this harder, or even

impossible, is unlikely to stop phishing. The phishers will

respond by attacking and subverting other parts of our on-line

lifestyle.

This doesn’t mean that we should ignore technological

advances in computer security, any more than we should

throw out the seat belts, the airbags and the crumple zones

from the modern automobile. But it does mean that we need

to keep ourselves informed and vigilant when we spend

money on-line, just as we are encouraged to be safer and

more responsible drivers on the road.

About the Author

This article was provided by Sophos and is reproduced here with their full permission. Sophos provides full data protection services including: security software, encryption software, antivirus, and malware.

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